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“Relief is a political gesture:” The
Jewish Labor Committee’s






2 The Jewish Labor Committee was founded in New York in February 1934 as a movement
to combat Nazism and Fascism in Europe as  well  as  their  possible  influence in the
United States.  Situated at the crossroads of organized Labor and American Jewry it
assembled the American working class forces of the non-communist Jewish left mostly
represented  by  the  garment  trades  unions  (International  Ladies  Garment  Workers’
Union,  ILGWU,  and Amalgamated Clothing  Workers  of  America,  ACWA)  and by  the
fraternal  order  of  the  Workmen’s  Circle  and  other  socialist  and  secular  Jewish
organizations  (Left  Poale  Zion,  Jewish  Socialist  Verband,  the  Jewish  Daily  Forward
association). Together these organizations represented half a million persons, which
only constituted a  fragment of  the US labor movement,  and a fraction of  the total
Jewish-American population.  Yet the JLC stood at the vanguard of American labor’s
position in the fight against Nazism and Fascism. The JLC’s self-ascribed mission was
multiple  as  subsumed  in  its  title  as  defending  both  Jewish  and  labor  interests.  As
expressed in its constitution, the JLC had come into existence to “give aid to Jewish and
non Jewish labor institutions overseas;  to  assist  the democratic  labor movement in
Europe; provide succor to victims of oppression and persecution and to combat anti-
Semitism and racial and religious intolerance abroad and in the United States”.1 This
multiple vision came from the Bundist history of the JLC’s founders. Nearly all of them
(certainly the initial leaders B.C. Vladeck, Sidney Hillman, David Dubinsky), before they
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emigrated  to  the  United  States,  had  been  actively  engaged  in  the  struggle  for  the
defense of the Jewish working class in the Zone of settlement of the Russian Empire.
The  Bund,  founded  in  1897,  had  made  it  its  mission  to  defend  Jewish  workers  as
workers but also as Jews, to fight for their political and economic rights, defend their
language (Yiddish) and secular culture against the tsarist repression.
3 In the interwar years, in independent Poland, the Bund, a non-communist but socialist
workers’ party, had maintained these objectives of cultural autonomy and defense of
the  Jewish  proletariat.  Since  1930  its  affiliation  with  the  Labor  and  Socialist
International connected it to the whole European non-communist left.
4 Because of their background as former political refugees themselves, the JLC leaders
who had had to seek refuge in the United States, were acutely sensitive to the two-
pronged aspects of the Nazi persecution exerted against Jews and the labor movements
in the countries under German domination.  In that sense their movement diverged
from mainstream American labor organizations whose tradition of political neutrality
isolated them from European labor institutions. In addition the JLC also diverged from
the major Jewish organizations in America, most of which represented more middle
class and Zionist interests.2 Often cooperating with them against anti-Semitic prejudice
and  Nazi  propaganda,  the  JLC  nevertheless  stressed  that  the  struggle  against  anti-
Semitism should not be fought only as a Jewish concern but should be part of a larger
combat borne by the solidarity of international labor forces.
5 This  paper  explores  the  relationship  between  the  humanitarian  and  the  political
motivations underlying the JLC’s operations. In other words it represents an attempt to
probe the relationship between its Jewish and Labor motivations. In the course of their
action, the JLC officers emphasized one or the other dimension of their struggle. The
first  phase  of  the  JLC’s  operations,  clearly  political,  has  already  been  explored  in
previous publications (Collomp, 2003, 2004, 2005; Jacobs; Malmgreen). These highlight
how the JLC was able to save prominent anti-Nazi and antifascist leaders and political
activists  from certain arrest  by the Gestapo in the advance of  the German army in
Poland and in France. On the whole, some 1500 European labor and socialist leaders,
whether Jewish or not, and family members, were thus brought to a safe haven in the
United States or to other countries in the western hemisphere in 1940 and 1941. This
operation, which saved cadres of the European socialist and social-democratic labor
movements, however, was drawing to a close during the last months of 1941 and had
ended by the time the United States entered the war. After this first and political phase
of its interventions, as the Nazi onslaught against Jews became massive, systematically
destructive, and final, the JLC’s commitment to save Jewish lives became predominant.
At the same time, the JLC gave political support to the underground labor and social-
democratic organizations in Nazi-dominated countries. Concerning the combatants in
the Jewish ghettos of Poland, no distinction contrasting Labor to Jewish concerns would
make sense. In the JLC’s own administrative language the distinction was often posited
as between “rescue” (of political leaders) and “relief” (of the Jewish masses) or between
the support of “underground labor” and “ aid to the ghettos”.3 Yet in the tragic and
extreme situation of Polish Jews during World War II, both the humanitarian support of
the  ghettos  and  the  financing  of  their  resistance  against  the  German  forces  were
necessary. 
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The JLC as a relief organization?
6 After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, understanding that the war
had placed the 3.5 million Polish Jews “in a virtual hell,” the JLC wondered whether it
should not transform itself into another relief institution. The situation was appalling.
By  1940,  Polish  Jews  had  been  turned  into  refugees  in  the  region  of  the  General
Government controlled by the Germans as well as in the East under Soviet rule. By
November, all major cities had Jewish ghettos; 400,000 persons were crammed in the
Warsaw ghetto, an area formerly designed to house 150,000 people. Jews were deprived
of  their  property,  means  of  livelihood,  and  forced  into  slave  labor.  Poverty  was
extreme,  disease  widespread.  In  the  spring  of  1941,  the  American  Jewish  Joint
Distribution  Committee  (JDC  or  Joint)  recognized  that  it  could  hardly  alleviate  the
hardship of half of the 1.8 million Jews in the part of Poland controlled by the Germans.
Another  1.3  million  Jews  were  unreachable  in  the  Russian  controlled  area  (Bauer,
94-103;  Engel,  1987).  If  the  Joint  could  not  alleviate  such  misery,  independent  JLC
funding would have been even less adequate. Collaboration with the Joint and with the
United Jewish Appeal, rather, was advocated and endorsed. Yet, the JLC did not simply
become  a  branch  of  the  JDC,  it  maintained  its  particular  political  goals  as  an
independent organization. “The funds we raise are not only for relief, but also for labor
aid, for underground work, and for defense work in America,” JLC executive director
Isiah Minkoff asserted.4
7 The JLC position concerning relief had been reinforced by the appeal made to it by the
delegation of the Polish Bund in the United States. Three of its members had reached
New York in 1938-1939: former secretary of the Party’s Central Committee Emanuel
Nowogrodzki, as well as Jacob Pat, and Benjamin Tabachinsky, both formerly engaged
in the Party’s social work. The latter two were to play a central role in the development
of the JLC’s relief activity. Upon their reports on the conditions in Poland in September
1939,  the Bund representatives  and JLC executive  leaders  decided to  combine their
relief activities under the aegis of the JLC in order to maximize their resources. Jacob
Pat was appointed general secretary of the JLC and Tabachinsky responsible for fund-
raising in American cities.5 According to these delegates, “relief [in Poland] as practiced
by the Joint will not save the 3.5 million Jews. We cannot permit that the political,
economic and cultural activities of the Jewish masses should stop. We must organize
our relief work in America so that these activities should be strengthened and even
broadened.”6 Such words meant that the JLC would develop its cooperation with the
Joint, but would direct it in view of saving the political and cultural institutions created
by the Bund.  Under this  interpretation,  relief  would not  come only  in  the form of
material aid but was also to be aimed at the political and intellectual institutions of the
movement. As expressed by members of the Executive Committee, “the JLC assumes
responsibility  for  the  labor  movement  of  Poland  and  for  the  emigration  of  labor
people.”7 In  the  latter  part  of  this  sentence  “emigration”  referred  to  the  rescue
operation which was to take place in 1940-41. It must be recalled here that the JLC
supported Bundist leaders and scholars who had found refuge in Lithuania, and again
in July 1940 when they were trapped in this country now annexed by the Soviet Union,
it financed the rescue of about 100 of them. The JLC provided money, affidavits and
visas  for  their  perilous  escape  through  the  USSR,  Japan  (before  Pearl  Harbor)  and
across the Pacific, and welcomed them when they reached the American West Coast in
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the first months of 1941.When the rescue operations from France and Lithuania came
to an end, the JLC devoted its energy and resources to direct relief and support of the
Jewish population in occupied Poland.
8 Evidence from the first years of the war is fragmentary and conjectural. Information
from the provinces under German control only came from underground sources. Even
less information leaked from the zone under Soviet domination. But from July 1941,
when the German-Soviet Pact ended, the question of JLC aid to Jewish Polish refugees
under  Soviet  control  was  put  in  renewed political  and geographic  terms.  With  the
Soviet Union now part of the Allied forces, overt cooperation and direct action was
possible.  The JLC,  in its  historic  opposition to Communism, however,  had not  done
relief work in the USSR so far. This position prevented its leaders from sending relief to
Jewish people fleeing the advance of the German army eastward. Yet not cooperating
would  have  isolated  the  JLC  from  the  anti-fascist  “united  front”  with  Communist
organizations that was forming in the USA to combat Hitlerism. Had the JLC remained
out of that front, it would have shirked its responsibility toward Jewish masses. Raphael
Abramovitch  (former  head  of  the  Russian  Workers’  Social  Democratic  [Menshevik]
Party), who had been rescued from France by the JLC in the fall of 1940), in spite of his
ardent opposition to the Soviets,  was of the opinion that the JLC must be part of a
“united front” with Communist forces. “Every relief work is political work,” Benjamin
Tabachinsky said when other JLC members argued that, contrary to the Joint, the JLC
was not a relief organization or feared negative reactions to their fund-raising activity
if  they  cooperated  with  Communist  organizations.  Isaiah  Minkoff  summed  up  the
Committee’s discussion affirming that “the JLC is really a political organization,” and as
such “we must be part of the relief organizations which will be organized. Only the
Communists [so far] and the Joint are now able to work in Russia,” he said, enjoining
the JLC to be part of that effort.8
9 Upon this recommendation, the JLC stepped up its campaign to collect clothing, tents,
medicine and food for “Russian relief.” In agreement with the Russian consulate, the
transportation of these parcels was to be shipped from Los Angeles to Vladivostock on
Soviet  ships.  Between October  1941  and March 1942,  the  JLC  sent  22  transports  of
clothing, an expense of $ 10,645. By the end of 1942, it had spent 104,347 dollars in its
relief  for  Russia.9 In  September 1944,  the  JLC collaborated with the  United Nations
Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration  (UNRRA),  asserting  that  since  1941  it  had
collected clothing delivered to the Polish relief organizations for distribution among
refugees in Russia. Clothing certainly was within the province of garment workers who
thus donated a part of their labor for relief purposes, which came in addition to their
financial  contributions.  By  1945 JLC president  Adolph Held recapitulated that  since
1941 the JLC had donated millions of pounds of clothing to Soviet Russia, amounting to
$ 1,500,000.10 Communication  with  the  Polish  Embassy  in  Kuybishev  (USSR)  made
information  about  humanitarian  needs  and  the  transfer  of  goods  possible.  Such
contacts also allowed the tracing of hundreds of individuals to whom the JLC had sent
remittances and food packages.11 This  did not  mean,  however,  that  Polish Jews (let
alone known Bundists) by then forced to become Soviet citizens, were always protected
by the Soviet authorities.12 In March 1943, the release of the news of the assassination
on Stalin’s order of the two internationally known leaders of the Polish Bund, Henryk
Erlich  and  Viktor  Alter,  did  nothing  to  alleviate  the  JLC’s  fears  concerning  other
Bundist refugees and the Jewish civilian population in the USSR.13 In addition, Soviet-
Polish relations continued to deteriorate over the Katyn affair in 1943.14 In this context
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of doubts and opposite forces shaping public opinion,15 the JLC pursued its policy of
privileging its own sources of information and political choices for the distribution of
its support.
 
Money and weapons for the Warsaw ghetto
10 The JLC’s support of Jewish organizations in the Polish ghettos went beyond strictly
humanitarian concerns. In the extreme context of violence, want and terror in which
the Jews were placed in the ghettos,  the little  support exterior organizations could
provide was utterly and tragically inadequate. The complete isolation of the ghettos
destroyed the channels through which philanthropic organizations, such as the Joint,
transmitted funds. The ghettos were abandoned to the savagery of Nazi cruelty. Yet if
the  JLC’s  action  cannot  be  measured  by  what  would  have  been  even  minimally
necessary, the JLC leaders never forsook their “sacred sense of duty” as they learnt step
by step the reality of final destruction. The question in this context was not only to
direct help for survival, but to help the survivors fight in their insurrection against the
final assaults of the occupant.
11 Their sources of information and transmission certainly belonged to political networks.
12 The incredulity with which the Allied powers learnt about the destruction of European
Jewry and their absence of specific response to it has long been established (Lacqueur;
Wyman, 42-58; Breitman and Kraut, 146-66). The following paragraphs only intend to
point out that the Jewish Labor Committee never doubted the reality of the information
coming from Poland and acted accordingly either on its own or in conjunction with
other Jewish organizations. Through its contacts with the underground organization of
the Bund resisting in the Warsaw ghetto, the JLC was among the very first American
organizations to be informed of the systematic destruction of Jews in Poland. The Bund
was the first political party to reorganize itself in the ghetto and it remained the most
influential  one  (Blatman,  74,  Edelman,  1946,  1).  The  active  members  of  its  Central
Committee transmitted news to Szmul Zygielbojm who since April 1942 represented the
Bund in the Polish government in exile in London, and who forwarded them to the
Bund  delegation  in  New  York.  Directly  involved  in  the  reception  of  couriers  and
messages from underground Jewish organizations in Poland, Zygielbojm became the
source of information for the Western world on the fate of the Jewish population in
Poland.16 The responsibility on his shoulders was also tragic for him. When the Warsaw
ghetto  uprising  ended,  its  people  having  been  massacred  or  deported,  to  protest
against the Allied nations’ lack of response to the systematic annihilation of the Jews,
on May 12 1943 Zygielbojm committed suicide. 
13 Information on extermination started reaching Zygielbojm in the spring of  1942;  it
came from Leon Feiner, a member of the Central Committee of the Bund who was also
in contact with the Polish Socialist Party underground. Able to work in and outside of
the ghetto, Feiner became the agent of the Bund’s contacts with the exterior world.
Leon  Feiner’s  first  letter  in  May  1942  stated  that  over  700,000  Jews  had  been
assassinated. It reported on the massacres in Vilno and Lvov, the deportations from
Lublin,  the gassing in sealed trucks at Chelmno, and the April  17 attack in Warsaw
which  had  decimated  the  ranks  of  Bundist  resistance.17 Indignant  that  the  Polish
government  in  London  downplayed  the  news,  and  that  the  American  press  hardly
mentioned  it,  the  JLC  joined  the  American  Jewish  Congress  and  other  Jewish
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organizations in a petition to obtain a declaration by the President of the United States:
“We respectfully request you, Mr. President to again raise the voice of America and its
Allies in the defense of the most defenseless people in Europe.”18 In August of the same
year  the  JLC’s  Executive  Committee  was  informed of  the  beginning  of  the  German
“action” aimed at eliminating the whole Jewish population from the Warsaw ghetto and
received the news of the suicide of the president of the Judenrat Adam Czerniakow in
July. With members of the Bund delegation, they held an evening of commemoration
and mourning and now understood that protest was not enough. They perceived that
Adam Czerniakow’s suicide was “a call for combat and resistance, and that the fight for
a new world would be led with the Polish underground labor movement.”19 By the end
of September, according to their sources, 256,000 Jews had been deported from Warsaw
to Treblinka. On September 24, the JLC Executive Meeting met to share the news which
had reached the Bund Representation in New York, from “underground movements in
Poland”  which  raised  the  hope  that  “the  walls  of  the  ghetto  [had]  been unable  to
separate the Jewish and Polish underground movements in the preparation for armed
resistance  together.”20 Acting  upon  the  underground  movements’  demand  that
“knowledge  about  the  Nazi  massacres  of  the  Jewish  population  in  Poland,  and  the
heroic resistance of the Jewish socialist movement be transmitted to American public
opinion  and  especially  to  the  organized  working  class”,  the  JLC  held  a  special
informative session during the American Federation of Labor’s Convention in October
1942. A long report prepared by the JLC was therefore read to the convention in which
not only the latest information about the massacres in Poland was given but also facts
and figures about deportations from France, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.21
Recognizing that the cause for the Jews of Poland was linked to that of their brethren in
the other occupied countries, the JLC internationalized its vision of resistance against
Nazi tyranny. In late November 1942, the JLC received the contents of Leon Feiner’s
second  letter  (written  in  August  1942)  to  Zygielbojm  which  further  confirmed  the
massive  deportation  from  the  Warsaw  ghetto:  “300,000  Jews  were  slaughtered  in
Warsaw between July 22 and October 2 [1942]. No more than a handful of our family
[the Bund] remained alive. Medem sanatorium demolished. […] We are helpless and
unless immediate relief is forthcoming we shall all perish. Deposit money with Polish
Government which will forward it to us.”22 Simultaneously, JLC leaders received news of
Jan Karski’s  report  to  Zygielbojm in  London.  A  courier  for  the  underground Polish
government and for the underground Army (Armia Krayova), Karski reported verbatim
his encounter with two Jewish leaders in Warsaw - one of whom was Leon Feiner - and
of his clandestine visit to the Belzec extermination camp. Unable, like the other Jewish
American organizations with which it appealed to President Roosevelt, to move the US
Administration and the Allied Powers  beyond their  strategic  goals,  the  JLC did  not
harbor illusions about the fate of the few surviving Jews resisting in Warsaw, as well as
in other ghettos.23 The words transmitted by Karski had been unequivocal: “The ghetto
is going to go up in flames. We are not going to die in slow torment, but fighting. We
will declare war on Germany, the most hopeless declaration of war that was ever made”
(Karski,  356).  The  JLC  pursued  its  own  course  of  action,  committing  itself  to  the
transmission  of  money,  not  only  for  survival,  but  also  for  the  support  of  armed
resistance.
14 To some extent, the JLC’s channels of action defied American wartime legislation. It had
been able to circumvent the US Trading with the Enemy Act which forbade the sending
of relief in cash or kind to territories controlled by the enemy. Since 1942 with the US
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entry in the war, the Joint had thus been unable to pursue its activity in support of
Polish Jews in the region of the General Government. And the destruction of its Warsaw
agency had put an end to its official presence there. It was finally by aligning itself with
the Jewish Labor Committee’s method of transmission of funds through Zygielbojm and
the Polish government in London that the Joint was able to resume its relief activities
in 1943 (Bauer, 332).
15 Indeed since  1941,  the  JLC  had regularly  sent  money in  increasing amounts  to  the
organizations of  the Warsaw ghetto,  via  the London government which parachuted
these sums to Poland.24 Its records contain the list of checks sent to London, month
after  month  from  1941 to  1944.25 These  sums  added  up  to  18,455  dollars  in  1941;
$ 28,393 in 1942; $ 113,000 in 1943; $ 182,000 in 1944. In addition, the JLC stated having
transmitted  $ 500,000  for  the  Joint  in  1943-1944.  Sometimes,  the  JLC  could  directly
deliver the money when a visitor from the Polish government in exile came to the
United States. Such was the case in September 1943, when $ 33,000 were given to the
Finance Minister of Poland on a visit in New York, “for aid to the Jewish People in
Poland and for the Jewish underground anti-Nazi labor movement.”26 The JLC generally
received news that its money had been received. In 1944, Jacob Pat asserted that “the
Jewish underground movement in Poland confirms the receipt of $ 81,000 remitted for
rescue and relief.”27 Mail between Jacob Pat and various Polish representatives reveals
that  money  was  generally  sent  in  monthly  installments  ($ 5000,  $ 7000  or  $ 10,000
sums) via London, and specifically destined to certain political groups, such as Bund,
Polish  Socialist  Party, Left  Poale  Zion,  Zionist  Youth  Organization,  Polish  Labor
Underground.  In  July  1944,  Jacob  Pat  sent  a  check  of  $ 40,000  for  the  Polish
Underground  movement.28 In  a  1944  memo  recapitulating  financial  assistance  to
Poland, Jacob Pat stressed that this aid had served both humanitarian and political
objectives, and supported several Jewish groups:
16  
The largest amount of money collected by the Jewish Labor Committee was shipped
to help the Jews in the ghettos,  for Jewish rescue, and to give assistance to the
underground movement in the occupied countries in general. As an illustration, we
merely wish to cite the expenditures of the JLC in 1944. Out of an income of half a
million dollars, the JLC appropriated $ 360,241 for this purpose. One quarter of a
million dollars of this money went to the Jews in the ghettos.
The general Jewish budget in Poland in 1943 and 1944, was covered by the Jewish
Labor Committee to the extent of 50%. I emphasize “general Jewish budget”. That
means for all Jewish needs, such as hiding, as well as rescuing Jews, and providing
them with food, etc. In the city of Warsaw alone, the JLC was instrumental in giving
sustenance to 10,000 Jews. One half of the resources for this purpose was provided
by the JLC, and the remainder by other Jewish funds. 
It is a lie to say that the Jewish Labor Committee gave support to only ONE group in
Poland. As pointed out above, the JLC covered 50% of the general Jewish budget, for
general relief purposes. In addition, it gave assistance to the underground groups of
the Bund, Right and Left Poale Zion and Hashomer Hatzoir [sic]. The Youth of the
Hashomer Hatzoir played an important role in the fight of the ghettos.29
17 The contents of Pat’s letter confirm that the JLC provided relief to surviving Polish Jews
in or out of the ghetto on an equal basis with the Joint. Secondly the letter highlights
Pat’s distinction between the “general Jewish budget” for relief and the JLC’s support of
Jewish political organizations for their preparation for the defense of the ghetto. 
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18 In the fall of 1942, the survivors in the ghetto organized themselves for combat. They
formed the Jewish Fighting Organization representing every Jewish ideological group
in the ghetto.30 Among them members of the youth organizations - Tsukunft (Bundist)
and Hashomer Hatzair (Left Poale Zion) - were predominant. Young Marek Edelman
represented the  Bund in  this  coalition (Goldstein,  Edelman,  1946,  1993).  The whole
ghetto turned towards preparing for battle.  The problem of obtaining weapons was
crucial. They hoped for the support of the underground Polish parties to help them in
this crucial mission. “We bought stolen arms from guards at army dumps, from German
soldiers, from Poles who worked in arm factories. With restless hysteria, we explored
every avenue, tracked down every lead, knowing that the end was close and that we
must be ready”(Goldstein, 174). Obvious sources were the official underground Polish
Army (Armia Kryova), and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In its hope that Jewish and
Polish militants would fight for their common liberation, and out of political solidarity
with  the  PPS,  the  JLC  from  its  end  contributed  to  financing  the  Polish  Socialist
organizations through their New York representatives as well  as in Poland.31 It  had
consistently contributed to Poland Fights, a publication launched by the Polish Labor
Group  in  New  York.  It  offered  to  support  the  underground  Polish  socialist  party,
especially when it sensed that unity could be reached on the two sides of the wall. Jacob
Pat specified to Wladyslaw Malinowski (the PPS representative in New York) that “the
Jewish Labor Committee’s assignments for aid to Poland were made on the basis of the
appeal from the Jewish underground movement in Poland through the Representation
of  the  Bund  in  America.  We  had  reasons  to  believe  that  the  Jewish  underground
movement in Poland gives certain sums to the Polish underground movement when
necessary for their purposes.”32 Exchange between the Jewish and Polish underground
organizations went both ways. In early 1943, when four groups of fighters in the ghetto
had been able to stop a new SS raid on January 18, and killed some 20 German soldiers
in the action, the Polish Army (AK) in recognition of such efficiency, sent a number of
rifles, hand grenades, plastic charges, and one machine gun to the ghetto combatants
(Krakowski, 176; Edelman 1946, 31).
19 The desired unity between the Jewish and the Polish resistance did not materialize. At
least  not  in  combat.  When SS  battalions  attacked the ghetto  on April  19 1943 with
armored cars, machine guns, and tanks, the “remnants” of the Jewish population found
themselves alone. They were able to resist longer than the time forecast by the German
army which had planned a  three-day operation to  liquidate  the  ghetto.  With what
military armament the Jewish fighters had been able to gather, their determination and
desperate use of every strategic point and bunker enabled them to resist for four weeks
and allowed some of them time to escape to the Aryan side. 
20 When  only  rubble  and  smoke  remained  from  the  burning  ghetto,  the  struggle
continued for surviving Jews hiding among Aryans. Vladka Meed, a young woman who
worked  with  Leon  Feiner  and  served  as  a  courier  for  the  Jewish  Coordinating
Committee and the Jewish Fighting Organization has given evidence that JLC money
was received and provided material help for survival: 
Funds eventually began to reach us through the same underground channels. First
mainly from the Jewish Labor Committee in the United States. Subsequently from
other Jewish organizations and to some extent from the Polish government in exile
as well. The money reached the Coordinating Committee in American dollars which
were exchanged for zlotys on the black market. 
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The primary objectives of the Coordinating Committee were to supply material aid
for Jews hidden in the Aryan sector, provide them with the necessary documents,
finding hiding places, aid for the children, establish contacts with inmates of slave
labor camps, with Jewish partisans and with friends abroad. And to keep constant
touch  with  the  Polish  underground.  In  Warsaw  alone  and  nearby  areas  we
ministered  to  some  12,000  persons.  (Meed,  182;  see  also  Edelman  1993,  96;
Goldstein, 251). 
21 Reporting its activity for 1944, the JLC stated that it had sent “large sums of money to
the ghettos. This money was distributed for relief and rescue, for aid in the labor and
concentration  camps,  for  the  underground  movement  and  for  the  necessary
preparations for resistance”.33
22 From the winter of 1943, the JLC enlarged the scope of its action in the United States
and made it more public. First it started publishing a monthly magazine, Voice of the
Unconquered,  which  regularly  reported  on  events  concerning  Jewish  people,  the
resistance movements in European countries, and finally on the progress of liberation.
The organ’s coverage of the Jewish question to some extent filled the void left by the
main commercial press which often “ignored” news on the subject or relegated it to
back  pages  (Lipstadt,  218-240).  Every  month  the  pages  were  filled  with  news  from
Poland;  very  often  they  reported  on  the  situation  in  France,  and  also  on  Holland,
Belgium and Norway. In 1945, the JLC organized the first exhibition on ”Martyrs and
Heroes of the Ghetto”; its opening on April 19 commemorated the beginning of the
uprising of  the Warsaw ghetto  two years  before.  The JLC cooperated with the War
Refugee Board from its inception in 1944, and contributed to the rescue of a number of
Hungarians  by  offering  channels  of  evacuation  for  them  and  providing  visas  for
admission in  the  United  States  or  in  another  country.  In  April  1945,  JLC  president
Adolph Held participated in the United Nations founding conference in San Francisco
where he presented “a 13 point program on reconstruction of Jewish life in Europe”.
The world labor leaders in attendance pledged their full backing and support of the JLC
document.34 When the war was over in Europe, the JLC collaborated with the UNRRA
(United  Nations  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration)  for  the  resettlement  of
Displaced Persons. And from 1946 it was active in funding reconstruction programs for
the surviving Jews of Poland and in France (Pâris de Bollardière, 2012, 2013). In the
winter of 1946, Jacob Pat made a journey to his native Poland. From town to town,
where he had once organized relief networks and the system of Yiddish schools, Pat
learnt about the tragedy in each community. In collaboration with the Central Jewish
Committee, which spoke for the approximately 80,000 survivors, he defined the most
urgent needs, and how they could be met. Upon his return in the United States, Pat
proposed  a  $ 250,000  budget  (for 1946)  for  the  support  of  workers’  cooperatives,
housing, cultural institutions, immediate relief (food and clothing), the preservation of
historic archives.  That sum was part of a 1 million dollars budget to cover all  such
expenses in Europe.35
23 °°°
24 An enormous gap remained between what help was provided to the forsaken ghetto
fighters  and  what  would  have  been  necessary  to  save  more  lives.  The  subject  has
become an intense subject of deploration by American historians and by the Western
World. In these few lines, by looking at the JLC’s work on behalf of Polish Jews, I have
tried to impart the notion that the Jewish Labor Committee never abandoned its Jewish
brothers in their tragic destiny. Although its leaders were well aware of the insufficient
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amount of the support they could offer, they never tired of organizing campaigns to
collect  money  among  their  constituency  of  American  workers,  Jewish  or  not,  who
belonged to the sectors of organized labor from which they sprang. The political links
historically existing between the JLC in the United States and the (non-communist) left-
wing Jewish organizations in pre- war Poland and then among survivors in the ghetto
defined the axis of their support, which served both humanitarian and political causes.
And if one looks back a few decades earlier in time, it is because these JLC leaders had
been  Bundist  militants  in  their  youth  in  the  Russian  empire  fighting  against  a
tyrannical power, or had cooperated with the interwar Polish Bund, that they were
politically,  culturally  and  linguistically  connected  to  the  Jewish  parties  and
organizations which ordained life  in the ghetto.  Neither immigration to the United
States  nor  the  Americanizing  effect  of  their  prominent  leadership  in  the  US  labor
movement had diluted the political dimension of their involvement. As demonstrated
by the case of their support of Polish Jews, they were able to become the interlocutors
of a Government in exile, and of underground political parties and labor movements. 
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NOTES
1. “Jewish Labor Committee Constitution”, Records of the Jewish Labor Committee Holocaust Era,
1934-1947, R1, Box 1, Folder 1, Robert Wagner Labor Archives, New York University, (hereafter
cited as JLC, followed by microfilm Reel, Box and Folder numbers). 
2. With  the  exception  of  the  American  Jewish  Committee  and  the  JLC,  the  major  Jewish
organizations in America were Zionist. 
3. 3 « JLC Report for 1944 », JLC R2, B1, F18.
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4. Meeting of the Office Committee, Dec. 26, 1940, JLC R1, B1, F6. By “defense work in America”,
Minkoff indicated the fight against anti-Semitism in the United States.
5. JLC Executive Committee, Nov. 8 1939, JLC R1, B1, F3; Blatman, 163-65. 
6. “Situation in Poland”, JLC Executive Committee, Sept. 7 1939, JLC R1, B1, F3. 
7. Executive Committee, November 8, 1939, JLC R1, B1, F3.
8. July 8 1941, Office Committee, JLC R1, B1, F6.
9. May 14 1942, Executive Committee, JLC R1, B1, F7; R130, B44, F7. 
10. Jacob Pat, to UNRRA, sept. 6. 1944, JLC R130, B44, F12; Jacob Pat stated that a total of $ 170,807
had been spent on help to Soviet Russia between 1942 and 1944, this figure did not include the
sending of clothing, JLC R2, B1, F17; A. Held, J. Pat and B. Tabaschinsky, “Memorandum”, 1945,
JLC R2, B1, F19.
11. Correspondence between Jacob Pat and Sylwin Strakacz, Minister plenipotentiary and Consul
General for Poland (New York), 1943-44, JLC R 40, B17, F9; Embassy of Poland, correspondence
with Lazar Epstein, JLC R40, B17, F10.
12. All Polish citizens on Russian territory were declared Soviet citizens by November 1939. But
in July 1941, Soviet authorities restored Polish citizenship to all  except minorities:  Ukrainian
Lithuanians, White Russians, and Jews (all “non Poles”) who remained Soviet citizens. 
13. In fact Erlich committed suicide in his cell in March 1942 and Alter was executed on February
17 1943.  The  information on  their  death  was  released  at  the  favorable  moment  for  USSR in
international  public  opinion,  that  is  after  the  Stalingrad  victory.  In  New  York,  the  JLC  and
representatives of the Bund led protest demonstrations on March 30 1943 (Engel, 1993, 55-62;
Blatman, 101-24).
14. The discovery by German military forces, in the Katyn forest near Smolensk, of mass graves
of executed Polish officers. The Soviets, whose responsibility was only officially recognized in the
1990’s, had denied their role in the massacre attributing it to the German invaders. 
15. David Engel suggests that it was doubtful whether there was a unity of interests between the
Jewish and the Polish communities in the government in exile and remarks that in spite of the
Katyn affair, world Jewish opinion remained favorable to the USSR, Facing a Holocaust, 72-74. 
16. Zygielbojm  shared  this  responsibility  with  Zionist  leader  Ignacy  Schwarzbart  who  also
represented Jewish interests in the Polish government in exile.
17. Leon Feiner’s letter is mentioned in Blatman, p. 185-86.
18. President Roosevelt’s response, July 17, 1942, expressed « sympathy with all victims of Nazi
crimes,  but  will  hold  the  perpetrators  of  these  crimes  to  strict  accountability  in  a  day  of
reckoning which will surely come » JLCR40, B17, F1.
19. Refusing  to  apply  the  Gestapo’s  order  of  providing  10,000  victims  everyday,  including
children,  for  the  deportations,  Czerniakow  took  his  own  life.  Minutes  of  the  Executive
Committee, August 26 1942 JLCR 1 B1 F3 (I thank Erez Levy for his translation from the Yiddish).
It  is  also  in  August  1942  that  Geneva  representative  of  the  World  Jewish  Congress,  Gerhart
Riegner, sent a message informing the State Department of the massive extermination of Jews.
The State Department however only allowed President of the World Jewish Congress Stephen
Wise to divulge the contents of this message on November 24. 
20. Minutes of the Sept. 24 1942 Executive Committee meeting, JLCR1, B1, F3 (transl. from the
Yiddish).
21. JLC R1, B1, F3. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings of the 1942 Convention, October
5-14, Washington DC, p. 637-43.
22. Received from the Polish Embassy, JLC R40, B17, F7.
23. The JLC along with the American Jewish Congress, B’nai B’rith, the Union of Orthodox Rabbis
and  the  American  Jewish  Committee  obtained  an  interview  with  President  Roosevelt  on
December  8 1942,  JLC  R2,  B1,  F17.  Their  demand  contributed  to  the  December  17 1942  joint
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declaration  by  the  Allied  Nations  who  condemned  Hitler’s  « bestial  policy  of  cold-blooded
extermination ».
24. Marek  Edelman,  one  rare  survivor  of  the  Ghetto  combatants  recalled  “these  parachuted
dollars with which we were able to buy weapons” (Mémoire du ghetto, 152, 171); Waltzer. 
25. JLC R 40, B17, F6; these sums are corroborated by Blatman’s sources, 208-09; see also Waltzer;
Bauer, 329-34.
26. Adolph Held, Sept. 1943, to Jan Kwapinski, Vice Premier of the Polish Government, London,
JLC R40, B17, F7. 
27. Jacob Pat to Louis Berman head of the Left Poale Zion in Warsaw, New York, April 6 1944, JLC
R130, B44, F12; the JLC donated $ 115,000 for 1943 and stated that $ 50,000 had been transferred
to Poland in the first six weeks of 1944, Voice of the Unconquered (the JLC organ), June 1944 p. 6, JLC
R159; memo on JLC sums sent to Poland, JLC R40, B17, F6.
28. Jacob Pat to Polish Embassy in Washington, JLC R 40, B17, F10.
29. JLC R2, B1, F17, see also Lebowitz and Malmgreen, 310. 
30. Zhidowska Organizatzia Boyova (ZOB).
31. Malinowski to Jacob Pat, August 23 1943 ; Dec. 13 1943 ; February 9 1944, JLC R40, B17, F6.
32. Pat to Malinowski, June 23 1943, JLCR40, B17, F6.
33. “From Gas Chambers to a New Life”, JLC Report, 1944, JLC R2, B1, F8.
34. Voice of Unconquered June-July 1945, p. 1.
35. Pat, Ashes and Fire; Voice of the Unconquered, May-June 1946,1, 5. In addition to the approximate
number of  80,000 Jewish survivors  in Poland,  some 150,000 Polish Jews were to return from
Russia.
ABSTRACTS
This paper describes the role of an American organization, the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), in
the support of Jewish people in Poland during World War II. In the context of the division and
occupation of Poland by the USSR and by Nazi Germany, the JLC’s help materialized in two ways:
relief (generally in kind) was sent to Jewish refugees in Russia; money was sent for relief and for
weapons to Jews in the General Government region under German rule. In the latter situation,
the JLC contributed to support the preparations for the insurrection of the Warsaw ghetto. The
channels of information and transmission by which the JLC acted are described in both cases. The
common Bundist political culture shared by both the leaders of the JLC in New York (former
political  refugees  themselves)  and  the  most  influential  political  organizations  in  the  ghetto
explains the JLC’s ability to come into contact with leaders of the ghetto and to react immediately
to the news of the systematic destruction of the Jewish population. In this extreme case, the
nature of the JLC’s interventions, a bridge between two worlds, is defined as being political as
well as humanitarian. 
Cet article décrit l’aide apportée aux Juifs de Pologne par une organisation américaine fondée à
New  York,  le  Jewish  Labor  Committee  (JLC)  pendant  la  Seconde  Guerre  mondiale.  Dans  la
situation de la division et occupation de la Pologne par l’URSS et par l’Allemagne nazie l’aide
matérielle du JLC se concrétisa de deux manières : aide humanitaire (généralement en nature)
pour les réfugiés en URSS, et envoi d’argent pour la survie alimentaire mais aussi pour l’achat
d’armes dans la région du Gouvernement général sous contrôle nazi. Dans ce dernier cas, le JLC
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contribua au soutien de l’insurrection du ghetto de Varsovie. Les voies de l’information et de la
transmission de biens sont analysées dans les deux cas. La culture politique bundiste, partagée
par les dirigeants du JLC à New York (anciens réfugiés politiques eux-mêmes) et par les dirigeants
les plus influents du ghetto explique la capacité du JLC à entrer en contact avec la direction du
ghetto et à réagir immédiatement dès que les nouvelles de la destruction systématique de la
population lui parvinrent. Dans ce contexte extrême, la nature de l’aide apportée par le JLC fut à
la fois humanitaire et politique.
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